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Jurors’ Perception of Violence: 
A Framework for Inquiry 
Brian H. Bornstein and Robert J. Nemeth 
Louisiana State University 
ABSTRACT: The impact that the perceived violence of a crime has on jury 
decision making has received much controversy lately. Violence may affect 
juries by how it is presented, as in the case of graphic evidence; its eviden-
tiary purpose, as in establishing a history of violence in domestic abuse cas-
es; and in sentencing, when the question of the heinousness of the crime is 
raised. Many judicial experts argue that evidence of violence may prejudice 
juries’ verdicts. There is also concern within the legal community that what 
constitutes a heinous crime cannot be objectively determined. Psychological 
research has only just begun to explore these issues. This paper reviews the 
current legal state of these issues, the arguments and questions that have been 
raised within the legal community, and the empirical research that has been 
conducted thus far. The paper concludes with directions for future research 
that would improve our understanding of how jurors’ perception of violence 
affects their decisions. 
KEY WORDS: Violence, jurors’ perception, jury decision 
Although overall crime trends, including incidents of violent crime, have decreased 
consistently over the last few years, crime rates are still much higher than they were a de-
cade ago (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 1996). 
In fact, compared with crime fi gures from 1985, overall crime has seen a 5% increase and 
violent crime has seen a 21% increase (FBI, 1996). While only about half of all violent 
crime arrests result in convictions and subsequent prison sentences (Petersilia, 1994), an 
important question that has not been clearly addressed by psychological research is how 
the perceived violence of a criminal act, as presented by testimony and other forms of ev-
idence, affects jury decision making. Evidence of violence may be introduced at both the 
guilt and penalty phases of a criminal trial. 
The relevance of this issue is ever more apparent today. Highly publicized cases such 
as the O. J. Simpson and the Oklahoma City bombing trials have revealed instances where 
graphic evidence and emotional testimony of the violent nature of the respective crimes 
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were presented, presumably in order to sway the verdicts and penalty decisions of the ju-
ries. For example, the harrowing testimony of Dr. James Sullivan, who had to amputate the 
leg of a pinned down survivor in the ruins of the Alfred P. Murrah building, revealed the 
following: 
I took disposal [sic] blades, [scalpels], and I had four, and they all broke. I used an am-
putation knife from the set . . . and it dulled because I kept hitting the concrete wall. 
I cut through a large vein . . . and thought initially I’d cut through the artery and that 
she was going to bleed to death, but it eventually stopped . . . and the big thing was 
making the fi rst cut, cutting through the skin. Once I started cutting, she started kick-
ing and screaming, so I had to more or less pin her free left leg against the wall. All of 
my scalpels had broken, and the amputation knife had dulled. I remembered that I had 
my pocketknife in my rear pocket, and I completed the amputation with a pocketknife. 
(U.S. v. McVeigh) 
Many such examples of this kind of testimony were present throughout the penalty 
phase of the trial to illustrate the heinousness of the crime. Timothy McVeigh was subse-
quently sentenced to death for planning and carrying out the bombing. 
Some factors that must be considered in a discussion of evidence of violence include 
introduction of graphic and gruesome evidence, the past history of abuse in cases of do-
mestic violence, and the heinousness of a crime. Photographic and videotaped evidence 
of victims and crime scenes, as well as crime scene reenactments, have received a lot of 
interest recently, both because of their polemical nature and increase in use (Campbell, 
1996; Curriden, 1990; Fagan, 1993; Hennes, 1994). Introduction of graphic evidence is 
more likely to be a factor that has its greatest impact in the guilt phase of a trial, especial-
ly when reenactments of the crime event are presented. Heinousness, on the other hand, is 
more likely to be considered in the penalty phase of a trial. In fact, most states provide for 
statutes that regard heinousness as an aggravating circumstance to be weighed in favor of 
a death sentence for capital crimes (Pollman, 1990; Rosen, 1986; Ward, 1988; Wiggins, 
1989). 
The purpose of this paper is to review the empirical research that exists on how vi-
olence affects jury decision making. The question of how violence affects the decisions 
reached by juries can best be studied by the direct manipulation of violence in some fash-
ion; yet, as this paper will reveal, few studies have thus far done so. For reasons of orga-
nizational clarity, the paper will follow the order of a criminal trial. That is, topics that are 
most relevant to the guilt phase of a criminal trial, such as the presentation of graphic ev-
idence, are addressed fi rst. Both the legal guidelines and the empirical literature that exist 
on introduction of graphic evidence are discussed. Heinousness, which is most relevant to 
the penalty phase of a capital trial, follows next. As a frame of reference, the heinousness 
section begins with a short overview of the proceedings of a capital trial, where it is likely 
to have its greatest impact. Following that, we discuss the legal defi nitions of heinousness 
as imposed by most courts and the assumptions that the court system makes about how 
these defi nitions are understood and used by jurors. Furthermore, we review the empirical 
literature that exists on the direct manipulation of heinousness. The paper concludes with 
suggestions for future research that is needed to provide a fuller understanding of the im-
pact of violence on jury decisions. 
GRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF VIOLENCE
Videotaped evidence is being put to an increasing number of uses in the courtroom, such 
as the presentation of depositions, experimental demonstrations, and day-in-the-life videos 
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(Campbell, 1996). It is most relevant to jurors’ perception of violence when it shows ei-
ther the scene of the crime (e.g., depictions of the victim as he/she was found) or a reenact-
ment of how the crime took place. Such visual aids constitute “demonstrative evidence,” in 
that they are used to illustrate other testimony or real evidence (Campbell, 1996; Hennes, 
1994). As such, pictorial evidence of violence must do more than merely provide a visual-
ization of prior oral testimony (Hennes, 1994). 
Because information may be retained better by jurors when it is presented visually than 
when it is presented orally (Campbell, 1996), there are concerns that visually graphic evi-
dence—for example, grisly pictures of a murder victim—would exert an undue infl uence on 
the jury (Curriden, 1990). According to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, any evi-
dence, though relevant, may be ruled inadmissible if the judge deems that its potentially prej-
udicial effect would outweigh its probative value. This rule has been cited frequently in de-
bates over the admissibility of evidence of violence, particularly when that evidence is pre-
sented in a graphic, visual manner (e.g., Campbell, 1996; Hennes, 1994). 
Photographs or videotapes of the crime scene itself, as well as victims, are being shown 
to juries in an increasing number of judicial districts (Curriden, 1990; Fagan, 1993). Be-
cause such depictions may be prejudicial to the defendant, they are generally inadmissi-
ble if their sole function is to infl ame the jury by exposing them to gore for gore’s sake 
(Curriden, 1990). As with demonstrative evidence in general, however, graphic pictures 
are typically admissible if they tend to prove or illustrate some material issue in the case 
(Fagan, 1993). Specifi cally, 
. . . the fact that [a photograph of a victim’s gory remains] may evoke an emotional re-
action from the jury does not necessarily make it prejudicial. There may be nothing 
wrong with shocking a jury with the repulsiveness of a crime, as long as the impression 
made by the evidence in question is commensurate with its probative worth. (Gold, 
1984, p. 82) 
The courts have ruled that graphic photographs of crime victims, especially when depicting 
the cause of death in murder cases, may be regularly admitted for this purpose (Fagan, 1993). 
For example, the New York Appellate Court has ruled that “photographs of a deceased person, 
no matter how gruesome, were admissible if they tended to prove, disprove, illustrate, or eluci-
date a material issue or other evidence offered in a case” (Fagan, 1993, p. 149). 
Despite the perennial concerns that visual portrayals of crime scenes will be prejudi-
cial (e.g., Curriden, 1990), little research has been done to document their effects. A no-
table exception in this regard is an experiment conducted by Kassin and Garfi eld (1991), 
in which mock jurors read a transcript of a murder trial in order to reach a verdict (with-
out deliberation). Prior to reading the transcript, one-third of the participants viewed a 1-
minute videotape of the crime scene, which contained a close-up of the bloodied body of 
a young man lying in the street with stab wounds in his chest. The footage was from a real 
crime that took place in New York City. Another third of the participants viewed the same 
videotape but were told that while it showed the scene of a crime in New York, the trial 
they would read concerned a similar crime in another city. This “non-relevant” graphic ev-
idence condition was included to assess whether there would be any general effects—that 
is, not specifi c to the case at hand—on participants’ verdicts of viewing graphic evidence. 
Finally, another group of participants viewed no videotaped evidence. 
Surprisingly, participants who viewed the crime scene—in both the relevant and nonrel-
evant conditions—did not perceive the crime as more violent than participants who mere-
ly read about the crime. In addition, viewing the crime scene had no effect on participants’ 
verdicts or on their subjective probability that the defendant committed the crime. Thus, 
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there was no main effect on jurors’ judgments of being exposed to evidence of violence. 
However, participants who watched the relevant videotape did set a lower threshold for 
conviction than participants in the other conditions; that is, they responded with lower fi g-
ures to the statement, “The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a ____% 
chance that he committed the crime.” This fi nding suggests that the graphic evidence did 
have some effect on their judgments about the case. 
The effect of graphic evidence on participants’ conviction threshold was especially pro-
nounced among participants who were classifi ed a priori as favoring the prosecution. Par-
ticipants who were classifi ed as prosecution-biased were also more likely than defense-bi-
ased participants to believe the defendant committed the crime, but only if they had seen 
the relevant videotape. These differences between prosecution- and defense-biased partic-
ipants might be one reason why death-qualifi ed jurors, who tend to be prosecution-biased, 
are more likely to convict than jurors whose death penalty views preclude them from sit-
ting on juries in capital cases (Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984). Finally, participants 
who saw the graphic evidence—whether or not it was relevant to the case they were judg-
ing—reported lower estimates of the current national homicide rate, and they were also 
more likely to believe that the homicide rate was increasing. 
In summary, results of Kassin and Garfi eld’s (1991) experiment are somewhat mixed. 
On the one hand, there was no effect of graphic videotapes on the primary dependent vari-
able, mock jurors’ verdicts. This fi nding suggests that fears about the prejudicial impact of 
such footage may be overblown. On the other hand, the evidence did affect the mock ju-
rors in important ways, both regarding the specifi c case—in lowering the threshold that 
they relied upon for conviction—and more broadly, in affecting their perceptions about the 
rate of homicides in general. These fi ndings lead Kassin and Garfi eld (1991) to conclude 
that “on the question of whether [the tapes] have a prejudicial effect, [the] data . . . offer 
compelling reasons for concern” (p. 1470). 
If videotapes of crime scenes have been controversial, crime scene reenactments have 
been even more so. Such reenactments are being used increasingly when there is confl ict-
ing evidence about the circumstances of a crime; the reenactments are designed to illus-
trate one side or another’s version of the facts (Hennes, 1994). When reenactments are ad-
mitted into evidence in the prosecution of violent crimes such as murder, the jurors are es-
sentially witnesses to a very vivid portrayal of a violent, real-life event. Like footage of an 
actual crime scene, reenactments constitute demonstrative evidence and are subject to ex-
clusion if their potential for arousing prejudice outweighs their probative value. Howev-
er, they are commonly held to be even more prejudicial than mere crime scene videotapes, 
due to the myriad variables involved in recreating events and the large potential impact of 
slight variations in how the event is fi lmed, acted, or produced (Hennes, 1994). As such, 
crime scene reenactments have historically been deemed inadmissible, but the situation 
has recently begun to change (Hennes, 1994). 
Although these arguments for how crime scene reenactments might potentially prej-
udice jurors are very logical, no experimental studies have been done along the lines of 
Kassin and Garfi eld’s (1991) experiment to determine their actual impact. It is presently 
unknown, for example, whether a graphic reenactment of the prosecution’s theory of how 
a murder was committed would sway a jury more than the prosecutor’s oral explanation 
of the theory. It is also not clear what effect, if any, variations in how the reenactment was 
fi lmed—as in using different actors, different camera angles, etc.—would have on jurors’ 
judgments. In the absence of such data, claims that “the jury will rely disproportionately 
on the vivid piece of evidence” (Hennes, 1994, p. 2172) are premature. 
Of course, evidence of violence does not need to be visual in order to be graphic; ver-
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bal descriptions can be graphic as well. Fishfader, Howells, Katz, and Teresi (1996) pre-
sented mock jurors with a wrongful death lawsuit in one of three formats: print transcript, 
videotaped testimony, or videotaped testimony plus reenactment. In the latter condition, 
participants were shown a videotape depicting the drowning death of a young girl, due 
to her hair’s becoming entangled in a spa’s suction cover, as well as attempts to resusci-
tate her. Participants in the other conditions merely saw (or read) witnesses’ descriptions 
of the event. Participants who viewed the reenactment were more emotionally affected 
by the trial than were participants who read the transcript, but not compared to those who 
saw videotaped testimony; in addition, the trial format affected neither mock jurors’ li-
ability judgments nor their damage awards. These fi ndings suggest that visual reenact-
ments are not necessarily more powerful than third-party descriptions of the same event, 
especially when those descriptions are presented visually. Written descriptions of violent 
crimes, if suffi ciently graphic, might also be expected to affect jurors’ judgments in a 
comparable manner. 
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE
The previous section addressed the impact of evidence of violence pertaining to the act 
for which a defendant is being tried. In some cases, evidence of prior acts of violence—not 
directly related to the present offense—is also presented at trial. As with graphic evidence, 
such “bad acts” evidence is controversial. The issue was prominent in the O. J. Simpson 
criminal trial, where the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s pri-
or abusive behavior toward Nicole Brown Simpson (Linsky, 1995). According to Linsky 
(1995), judges are often hesitant to admit such testimony because of its prejudicial poten-
tial. It is usually inadmissible if its purpose is solely to discredit the defendant by showing 
a criminal propensity or making him out to be a bad character, but it is admissible if its po-
tential prejudice is outweighed by its tendency to establish an element of the crime, such 
as intent, motive, pattern of behavior, or identity of the defendant (Linsky, 1995). For ex-
ample, in the trial of a defendant for domestic violence, evidence of prior abuse or threats 
can help establish that the defendant had a motive to commit the present act of violence, 
and also that his conduct in the present instance was intentional. Thus, some commentators 
argue that it is critical for juries in domestic violence cases to be presented with evidence 
of prior bad acts, despite the testimony’s potential prejudice (e.g., Linsky, 1995). Such ev-
idence has been found to increase the degree to which the husband is perceived as respon-
sible for the abuse (Sugarman & Cohn, 1986). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that 
such evidence would, because of its probative value, also increase the likelihood of con-
viction; however, additional research is needed to determine how various characteristics of 
previous violence—such as the type and frequency of the violence—would affect jurors’ 
judgments. 
A related way in which evidence of prior domestic violence can infl uence jury decision mak-
ing is when it is not the abuser, but the victim, who is on trial. These cases of battered wom-
en who kill their husbands almost always involve a history of abuse (Follingstad, Polek, Hause, 
Deaton, Bulger, & Conway, 1989); in fact, such a history is one of the major criteria for invok-
ing the “battered woman syndrome” defense (Schuller & Vidmar, 1992). As this defense is a 
relatively recent legal development (Schuller & Vidmar, 1992), there has not yet been a great 
deal of research addressing jurors’ response to it. Nonetheless, the research that has been done 
on the battered woman syndrome offers some intriguing results. 
For example, Follingstad et al. (1989) presented mock jurors with a fi ctitious case in 
which a repeatedly abused wife killed her husband and was subsequently on trial for mur-
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der. They manipulated several factors, including the level of force used by the husband 
against the wife on the night she killed him and whether or not an expert witness present-
ed testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Specifi cally, participants were told that the 
woman killed her husband: as he advanced on her with a weapon; as he advanced on her 
after beating her, but without a weapon; or after beating her, but while he was asleep. One-
half of each case type included an expert witness who described the battered woman syn-
drome, focusing especially on the psychological impact of a long-term history of violence. 
Although neither the level of force nor presence of expert testimony had a direct effect on 
participants’ verdicts, participants who rated either the severity of past beatings or the ex-
pert testimony as infl uential in arriving at their verdict were more likely to acquit the de-
fendant than those who were not infl uenced by these evidentiary components. In addition, 
participants rated the history of abuse as the single most infl uential piece of evidence in 
determining their verdict. These results suggest that increasing the salience of the history 
of violence—either by descriptions of the abuse itself or via an expert’s testimony—has a 
noticeable impact on mock jurors’ verdicts. 
Additional support for the impact of evidence of prior violence comes from a related 
study performed by Kasian, Spanos, Terrance, and Peebles (1993; Experiment 2), who ex-
perimentally manipulated the history of abuse suffered by a battered woman who was on 
trial for the second-degree murder of her husband. In the “moderate abuse” condition, over 
a 3-year period, she had received several black eyes, suffered a miscarriage as a result of 
blows to the abdomen, and been raped once; in the “severe abuse” condition, in addition 
to those injuries, she had also received broken bones, had teeth knocked out, and been tied 
to a chair and repeatedly beaten on one occasion. She was on trial for killing her husband 
while he slept, after threatening to kill her earlier in the evening. Importantly, the events on 
the night of the victim’s death—which constituted the basis of the criminal charge—were 
identical for the two prior abuse conditions. Nonetheless, mock jurors were signifi cant-
ly more likely to fi nd the defendant not guilty when the prior abuse had been relatively se-
vere, suggesting that evidence of prior violence affects jurors’ verdicts. Although the histo-
ry of violence is, in one sense, completely separate from the defendant’s actions during the 
incident for which she is on trial, it is directly relevant to her state of mind at the time of 
the offense and therefore at the heart of the battered woman syndrome defense (Schuller, 
1992; Schuller & Vidmar, 1992). 
HEINOUSNESS
The issue of how heinousness affects jury decisions is most readily applicable in the cap-
ital trial. The capital trial, like other criminal proceedings, is bifurcated, or split into two 
phases (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992; Ebbesen & Konecni, 1981; White, 1987). In the fi rst 
phase, jurors determine whether the defendant is guilty of a capital offense. If there is a 
unanimous decision of guilt, the same jury then determines whether the penalty of death or 
life imprisonment is appropriate (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992; Ebbesen & Konecni, 1981; 
White, 1987). The prosecution and defense offer evidence and arguments at both phases, 
but the evidence provided at the penalty phase is qualitatively different from that of the guilt 
phase (White, 1987). At the penalty phase, questions concerning the background and char-
acter of the defendant become most important. The prosecution tends to argue that the na-
ture of the crime and the defendant’s future dangerousness to society warrant the death pen-
alty, whereas the defense argues in favor of circumstances that mitigate the seriousness of 
the crime (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1992; White, 1987). 
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The United States has stated that the death penalty is a qualitatively different form of 
punishment from other sentences and, as such, has ruled that in order for the death penal-
ty to be administered fairly, and to avoid decisions that are arbitrary or discriminatory in 
nature, jury discretion in the capital penalty phase must be guided (Costanzo & Costanzo, 
1994; Pollman, 1990; Rosen, 1986; Ward, 1988; Wiggins, 1989). In most states, the pro-
cedure that has been adopted provides for the jury a list of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances that should be weighed against one another in determination of the appropriate 
sentence (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1994; Rosen, 1986; Wiggins, 1989). If the aggravating 
circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury should 
vote in favor of the death penalty. 
Prior to the capital proceedings, jurors are subject to death qualifi cation. Prospective ju-
rors are asked whether their beliefs in the death penalty, either for or against, would hinder 
their ability to impose the death penalty fairly (Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). However, 
there is concern that death qualifi cation of jurors possibly skews or biases the decision-mak-
ing ability of the jury (Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). For example, research has indicated 
that death-qualifi ed jurors are conviction prone (Bronson, 1970; Cowan et al., 1984; Gold-
berg, 1970; Jurow, 1971). Questions concerning the heinousness of a crime are most relevant 
as an aggravating circumstance (i.e., a circumstance that weighs in favor of the death penal-
ty). Possibly, death-qualifi ed jurors will be biased in differentially weighing aggravating cir-
cumstances, such as the perceived heinousness of a crime, compared to those jurors who 
would be excluded from a capital trial (Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). 
Research in this area has provided some, but far from compelling, support for this con-
tention. Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) divided actual jurors waiting to serve in cap-
ital trials by their death penalty beliefs along a four-point scale, from those strongly op-
posed to those strongly in favor of the death penalty. The jurors were given a list of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, as defi ned by the North Carolina Criminal Proce-
dures Act, and were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement using a six-
point Likert scale. For example, a representative aggravating circumstance was “A murder 
is worse if the murderer apparently got pleasure from the victim’s suffering,” and a repre-
sentative mitigating circumstance was “It would be appropriate to give a murderer a light-
er sentence if he or she had never been in trouble with the law before” (Luginbuhl & Mid-
dendorf, 1988, p. 280). Results indicated that agreement or disagreement with aggravating 
circumstances did not differ signifi cantly between those jurors opposed to the death penal-
ty and those jurors who supported it. On the other hand, analyses of data on mitigating cir-
cumstances revealed that those jurors who were opposed to the death penalty agreed more 
with those factors that mitigate the seriousness of a crime than those jurors who were in fa-
vor of the death penalty. 
However, to make for a more ecologically valid test of their hypothesis—that death qual-
ifi ed jurors are biased in the direction of overweighing aggravating circumstances in deter-
mining the appropriate severity of penalty—Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) replicated 
their study using the death qualifi cation criteria established by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1986), 
which is a more stringent criterion for classifying subjects than simple beliefs in the death 
penalty. They found marginally signifi cant differences between death-qualifi ed and death-
scrupled jurors (i.e., those who would be excluded from the capital trial) in their agreement 
with two aggravating circumstances in relation to determining the severity of the appropriate 
penalty. Death-scrupled jurors disagreed more than death-qualifi ed jurors with the statement 
that a murderer with a previous history of violence should be punished more severely. More 
importantly, as it bears on a direct relationship to the perceived heinousness of a crime, death-
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scrupled jurors disagreed more than death-qualifi ed jurors that a murderer who infl icts undue 
pain on a victim should be punished more severely. The implication of these results is that the 
process of death qualifi cation may affect jurors’ receptivity to consideration of aggravating 
circumstances in determining a sentence of life or death; however, given that only margin-
ally signifi cant results were found, further research is needed to determine more defi nitively 
whether concern about death-qualifi ed jurors’ ability to be fair in weighing the evidence at the 
penalty phase of a capital trial is warranted. 
As it stands, most states provide for an aggravating circumstance that addresses the ex-
treme nature or heinousness of the crime. However, the legal defi nitions provided by most 
courts are broad and vague, usually using terms that describe the nature of the crime as 
“heinous, atrocious, cruel, vile, wanton, or inhuman” and describe the defendant’s actions 
as displaying “depravity of mind” (Pollman, 1990; Rosen, 1986; Ward, 1988; Wiggins, 
1989). By the very nature of these terms, judicial scholars have argued that the “especially 
heinous” aggravating circumstance only broadens the discretion of the jury instead of di-
recting it, which is the express purpose of providing jurors with a list of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances (Rosen, 1986). 
Rosen (1986) has argued that the loose manner in which heinousness is defi ned by most 
courts results in its arbitrary use. For example, in most courts, jurors are allowed to interpret 
the heinousness statute in the disjunctive; that is, jurors must only fi nd that a murder fi ts any 
one of the descriptors that are used to defi ne the statute, not all of them. Hence, a murder that 
is found to be vile but not necessarily cruel can be an aggravating circumstance, etc. Addi-
tionally, Rosen has documented, in a massive accumulation of archival research, that there is 
no standard for the consistent application of the especially heinous aggravated circumstance. 
For example, the death penalty has been given for excessive cruelty when the victim was con-
scious and thus aware of his impending death, and also when the victim was unconscious and 
therefore unaware of his impending death; in both cases, the crime was found to fi t the hei-
nous aggravated statute. Rosen found many similar cases and concluded that the statute should 
be eliminated because it cannot be objectively administered. 
Some state supreme courts have recognized this problem; however, few have addressed 
it (Pollman, 1990; Rosen, 1986; Ward, 1988; Wiggins, 1989). The few that have attempt-
ed to limit the statute have done so by imposing more stringent criteria for what necessar-
ily constitutes a heinous crime and thus can be considered an aggravating circumstance 
(Rosen, 1986). To varying degrees these states require proof, through physical evidence, 
that the murder involved serious physical abuse or torture before the death of the victim. 
However, Rosen (1986) has demonstrated that this change in the interpretation of the es-
pecially heinous statute has failed to rectify the problem. Once again, clear defi nitions of 
what necessarily constitutes physical abuse or torture are lacking, and most of these states 
have been inconsistent in their application of the newly revised statute (Pollman, 1990; 
Rosen, 1986; Ward, 1988; Wiggins, 1989). 
Given that there are judicial scholars who suggest that jurors do not fully comprehend 
the instructions designed to guide their discretion or, at the very least, fail to apply them 
systematically, how does the empirical research bear out? In a review of the literature in-
vestigating juror comprehension of death penalty statutes, Diamond (1993) indicated that 
the court system implicitly assumes that jurors will understand the meaning and implica-
tions of the instructions and will be able to apply them objectively based on the evidence 
presented during the case. However, the research literature paints a different picture. In 
general, juror comprehension of judicial instructions tends to be poor (Elwork, Sales, & 
Alfi ni, 1982; Severance & Loftus, 1982). Furthermore, in the capital penalty phase both 
the meaning and application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances have been found 
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to be quite poorly understood among jurors (Diamond, 1993; Haney & Lynch, 1994; Wie-
ner, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995). 
Surprisingly, very little empirical research has been conducted on the very pressing and 
increasingly relevant question of how heinousness directly affects juror decision making. 
Hester and Smith (1973) examined how a mandatory death sentence interacted with the 
perceived heinousness of a crime. At the time the research was conducted, the Supreme 
Court was reevaluating the constitutionality of the death sentence, and the possibility of a 
mandatory death sentence for certain crimes was being considered. Mock jurors read a de-
scription of a murder case and rendered verdicts of guilt or innocence. 
Heinousness was manipulated by the details of the respective cases. Half of the sub-
jects read a description of a gang war murder in which a rival gang leader was killed in re-
venge for the torture and murder of one of the defendant’s companions (less heinous con-
dition), and half of the subjects read a description of a gang-initiation murder in which the 
defendant murdered a young girl to prove his loyalty to the gang (more heinous condition). 
In addition, the case description for the more heinous condition indicated that the defen-
dant chose a young girl as his victim partly “for kicks.” A manipulation check confi rmed 
that the murder of the young girl was rated as more heinous according to the defi nition of 
“hateful; wicked; abominable.” 
Furthermore, manipulation of heinousness was combined factorially with the presence or 
absence of a mandatory death sentence. In the mandatory death sentence condition, subjects 
were told that if found guilty, the appropriate penalty for the defendant would be death by 
hanging (subjects were led to believe that the case was taken from court fi les in Mexico); and 
in the condition without the mandatory death sentence, subjects were told that if the defen-
dant was found guilty the minimum penalty would be 20 years imprisonment up to a maxi-
mum of life imprisonment. Conviction rates were the dependent measure. 
Hester and Smith (1973) found that for the less heinous condition, mock jurors convicted 
the defendant signifi cantly more when they believed he would receive a sentence of imprison-
ment than when they believed he would receive a sentence of death; for the more heinous con-
dition, however, the difference between sentence conditions was not statistically signifi cant. 
The authors conclude that the data support the claim that the perceived heinousness of a crime 
would moderate conviction rates when a mandatory death sentence was present. 
There are a number of caveats to the Hester and Smith (1973) study. First, the victims’ 
gender and age were confounded between the heinous conditions. In the less heinous con-
dition the victim was an adult male, whereas in the more heinous condition the victim was 
a young girl. The authors acknowledge this potential problem and provide as a rationale for 
their decision to use different victims that the perceived heinousness of a crime is often de-
fi ned in terms of the characteristics of the victim, as well as the nature of the act. Granted, 
many states have found that particular murders warrant the especially heinous aggravating 
circumstance because the victim was either very young or very old (Rosen, 1986). 
However, if heinousness is to be defi ned in part by the characteristics of the victim, 
the characteristics of the defendant, and the nature of the act, a more revealing manipula-
tion would be to examine how these three aspects function to affect the perceived heinous-
ness of a crime. It would be worthwhile to determine whether and how the factors oper-
ate, both independently and in combination. In the Hester and Smith experiment, howev-
er, characteristics of the victims and the nature of the act were not manipulated separate-
ly. The victim was either an adult male or a young female. In the case where the adult male 
was killed, the defendant’s actions were described in part as being motivated out of re-
venge, whereas in the case where the young girl was killed, the defendant’s actions were 
described as an initiation killing, with the choice of victim being partly chosen for the per-
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verse joy it would bring the defendant. Nevertheless, the Hester and Smith experiment re-
veals that heinousness can affect jury decisions. Further research is necessary to disentan-
gle the various factors that affect the perception of heinousness. 
A more compelling manipulation of heinousness was conducted by Hendrick and Shaf-
fer (1975). Case descriptions that were read by mock jurors indicated that the victim’s body 
was either mutilated after death or not. In addition, for half of the participants the murder was 
performed by one killer; for the other half, the murder was performed by fi ve killers. Mock 
jurors read transcripts of the crime in which the defendant had already been found guilty and 
were asked to give a sentence between 5 and 99 years. Additionally, participants answered 
follow-up questions designed to tap further the effects of heinousness and number of kill-
ers. Participants indicated ratings of agreement/disagreement with the possibility of parole, 
the possibility the defendant was insane, and the appropriateness of a death sentence for this 
case. Also, participants rated how horrible and morally evil the crime was, along with the 
perceived intentionality and motive of the defendant. 
Hendrick and Shaffer (1975) found a main effect for the mutilation condition. Partici-
pants who had read the case description of the murder with mutilation gave sentences on 
average 50 years longer than those participants who read case descriptions that did not 
contain the mutilation manipulation. In addition, analyses of the follow-up questions re-
vealed that participants who read the case description containing the mutilation of the vic-
tim detail agreed less that the defendant should be released on parole, were more strongly 
in favor of the death penalty for the defendant, and perceived the defendant as possessing 
greater intentionality than those participants who read a case description that did not in-
clude the detail of the mutilation of the victim. 
Furthermore, main effects for mutilation and number of killers were found for the de-
pendent measure of insanity. Defendants who were charged with murder and mutilation 
were viewed as more likely insane than those defendants charged with murder only. Also, 
killers who acted alone were viewed as more likely insane than in the condition that in-
cluded fi ve killers. Likewise, for the question of how morally evil the crime was, main ef-
fects for mutilation and number of killers were found. Murders that were committed by 
fi ve killers were viewed as morally more evil than single killers and, not surprisingly, mur-
der-mutilation was viewed as morally more evil than murder alone. 
Hendrick and Shaffer’s (1975) results provide a preliminary and rather telling exam-
ple of the possible effects heinousness may have on jury decisions. Most apparent was the 
manner in which heinousness affected penalty decisions. Certainly there are limitations of 
this study. How these results are likely to generalize to the forensic setting is questionable, 
for the dependent measure was sentence length in years, whereas the details of the crime 
place it more likely as a capital offense in which the appropriate penalty would be a dich-
otic decision between life and death. Also, a more ecologically valid design that used cap-
ital sentencing procedures (i.e., guided juror discretion) would be more revealing; howev-
er, it must be noted that this research was conducted prior to many of the changes that have 
occurred in the sentencing phase of capital trials. Likewise, lack of jury selection analo-
gous to the forensic setting (i.e., death qualifi cation) further imposes limitations on the ex-
ternal validity of the results of Hendrick and Shaffer. Nonetheless, the study is a promising 
start in an area of research that is sorely lacking. 
Attempting to provide empirical evidence for where community sentiment stands with 
regard to felony-murder cases, Finkel and Duff (1991; Experiment 1) manipulated the rela-
tive roles of four defendants in four separate cases. The defendants were charged with con-
spiracy to commit a felony (robbery) and murder. Furthermore, the four defendant’s roles 
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were getaway driver, lookout, sidekick, and triggerman, respectively. In each case, the de-
fendants robbed a liquor store and, in the course of the robbery, the store clerk died. For 
the heart case, the clerk died of a heart attack as a result of the robbery. In the accident 
case, the clerk grabbed for the gun held by the triggerman and was accidentally shot when 
the gun went off. Similarly, during the heinous case, the clerk grabbed for the gun but the 
triggerman “went wild” and pistol whipped the clerk till he was bleeding profusely and 
then emptied all six shots from the revolver into him. Finally, in the premeditated case, af-
ter the defendants fi nished robbing the store, the triggerman stated he had been waiting for 
two years to kill the clerk and was not going to leave a witness who could identify them; 
he subsequently shot the clerk six times. 
Mock jurors were presented with one of the cases and were requested to decide verdicts 
for each of the defendants on the two charges, conspiracy to commit a felony (i.e., rob-
bery) and felony-murder (fi rst-degree murder for the premeditated case). Also, jurors de-
termined appropriate sentences depending on whether they found the defendant(s) guilty 
on one or both of the charges. 
Finkel and Duff (1991) found no signifi cant overall case effects for either the charge of 
conspiracy to commit a felony or felony-murder. However, for the felony-murder charge, 
conviction rates increased signifi cantly from the heart case (63%) to the accident case 
(79%) to the heinous case (88%), but for the triggerman defendant only. Furthermore, this 
same pattern of data was found for the death sentences given to those defendants found 
guilty of felony-murder. Signifi cant increases in death sentences were found between the 
heart case (7.7%), the accident case (13%), and the heinous case (31%). Once again, these 
results were only signifi cant for the triggerman. 
In a more recent study, Finkel, Hughes, Smith, and Hurabiell (1994) sought to deter-
mine the effects of heinousness on the community sentiment for imposing the death pen-
alty on minors. The two variables of interest were the age of the defendant and the per-
ceived heinousness of the crime. The age of the defendant varied along a range from 15 to 
25 years old. Mock jurors read one of three cases taken from actual court records and were 
subject to voir dire (i.e., jury selection). Afterwards, participants indicated verdicts of guilt 
or innocence and, if they found the defendant guilty of fi rst-degree murder, determined the 
appropriate sentence (i.e., either death or life imprisonment) after reading arguments from 
the penalty phase by the prosecution and defense. 
The fi rst case concerned the murder of a brother-in-law of the defendant. It was suggested 
that the brother-in-law had been physically abusing the defendant’s sister and that the murder 
was an act of reprisal by the defendant and three additional accomplices who were old friends 
of the defendant. The defendant and accomplices were charged with beating the victim, shoot-
ing him twice, slitting his throat, and stabbing him twice in the chest and abdomen. 
The second case involved the robbery and murder of a convenience store clerk. The defen-
dant, along with a single accomplice, planned to murder whomever was operating the cash reg-
ister in order to protect themselves from being later identifi ed. The clerk, described as a mother 
of two, was stabbed a total of eight times, two that penetrated her heart and one that opened the 
carotid artery in her neck. In addition, the description indicated that the defendant stabbed the 
clerk four times in the neck in response to the clerk’s pleading for her life. 
The third case also involved a robbery-murder, in addition to the repeated rape and sod-
omy of the victim. The victim was shot twice at point-blank range, once in the face and 
once in the back of the head. The case description indicated that the defendant murdered 
the victim because she was his neighbor and would likely be able to identify him. 
As is readily apparent, no a priori conclusions about the relative heinousness of the three 
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cases can be assumed. No manipulation check was conducted to insure that heinousness was 
systematically varied across the cases. All could be found heinous according to legal defi ni-
tions. Furthermore, there was no attempt to control for extraneous variables across the cas-
es. The cases differed widely in terms of the weapons used, the accomplices involved, the vic-
tims’ gender and relation to the defendant, the motivation of the defendant, and the actual acts 
involved (i.e., murder vs. robbery-murder vs. robbery-rape-murder). Finkel et al. (1994) found 
that the case that involved the robbery and murder of the convenience store clerk (i.e., the 
mother of two) received the most guilty verdicts and sentences of death. They conclude post-
hoc that since this case had the highest conviction rate and proportion of sentences of death, it 
was arguably the most heinous. This conclusion cannot be made, for no manipulation check 
was conducted to insure that this case was found most heinous a priori. 
White (1987) conducted a similar experiment. Mock jurors were presented with a sim-
ulated trial in which they were instructed that the defendant had been found guilty and that 
they were to participate in the penalty phase of the trial. One of three crime scenarios was 
presented to the jurors. The fi rst involved a robbery-unpremeditated murder in which the 
defendant shot and killed a convenience store clerk after she broke free of her bonds and 
began yelling hysterically. The second crime scenario was identical to the fi rst one, ex-
cept that the murder was premeditated. After tying up the clerk and emptying the cash reg-
ister, the defendant returned to where the clerk was bound and shot her twice in the head 
at point-blank range. Finally, the third crime scenario involved a case of heinous, multi-
ple murders. The defendant was charged with abducting and killing female hitchhikers on 
three separate occasions. 
After reading the trial descriptions, jurors read transcripts of the testimony that was 
presented in the penalty phase. In addition, White examined four possible defense strate-
gies for each of the crime scenarios. As the results indicated only a marginally signifi cant 
main effect of strategy, the defense strategies will not be discussed. Prior to deliberation, 
the jurors listened to closing arguments and were read capital sentencing instructions as 
given in California. Jurors indicated either a life or death decision and rated along a 10- 
point Likert scale how certain they were of their penalty decisions. Also, follow-up ques-
tions were given to assess jurors’ perceptions of how similar to other people they viewed 
the defendant, their beliefs on how dangerous the defendant would likely be in the future, 
and how much they felt the defendant’s behavior was due to his own choosing. An anal-
ysis of the penalty decisions revealed a main effect of crime type. Combining both their 
penalty decisions and their certainty ratings to form an interval scale with a range from 
1 (“very certain for life”) to 20 (“very certain for death”), results indicated that jurors 
were most punitive when presented with the multiple murder scenario. While these re-
sults seem to indicate how the perceived heinousness of a crime affects jurors’ penalty de-
cisions, no manipulation check was conducted to insure that the multiple murder was in-
deed viewed most heinous a priori. 
In sum, little empirical research has been conducted as to the effects of the perceived 
heinousness of a crime on jury decision making. Of the fi ve articles that have been found 
in an extensive literature search, two were published in the seventies and the other three 
only manipulate heinousness tangentially. Certainly, this area of research remains open 
with many questions left to be answered. While the research to date is spotty, the fi ndings 
bear important scrutiny. The results of Hendrick and Shaffer (1975) indicate that heinous-
ness can have a profound effect on the sentencing decisions of jurors. Furthermore, Hes-
ter and Smith (1973), Finkel and Duff (1991), and Finkel et al. (1994) demonstrated that 
heinousness may interact strongly with other legal factors of a capital trial. These results 
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pave the way for a line of research that more clearly examines the various factors that con-
stitute heinousness and how they may affect the decisions reached by jurors. The legal 
community has expressed reservations with regard to the current status of heinousness as 
an aggravating circumstance (Rosen, 1986). Unfortunately, the arguments that have been 
raised have little support aside from archival data (Pollman, 1990; Rosen, 1986; Ward, 
1988; Wiggins, 1989). Empirical studies are needed to help clarify the implications of the 
perceived heinousness of a crime for jurors’ penalty decisions. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As is evident from the research literature, the question of how violence affects jury de-
cision making has yet to be resolved. The impact of graphic evidence, jurors’ perceptions 
of a history of violence, and the effects of heinousness all pose research questions that are 
increasingly relevant to the legal community. By their nature, these topics have received a 
great deal of controversy because of the possible repercussions they may have on how ju-
rors reach verdicts and determine sentences. Empirical research is necessary to help clear 
up some of the controversy that exists, or, at the very least, to provide evidence for some of 
the arguments that have been forwarded. In the following section, we outline the most im-
portant research questions that have yet to be addressed in an attempt to provide a frame-
work within which future research could be conducted. 
Introduction of graphic evidence, with its increasing use in criminal trials, offers many 
potential avenues for research. Specifi cally, the issue of whether graphic visual evidence 
prejudices juries has yet to be conclusively demonstrated. Results of Kassin and Garfi eld 
(1991) suggest that effects of graphic visual evidence are relatively small. These results are 
surprising, for it seems intuitively plausible that photographed and videotaped evidence 
would prove to be a salient criterion on which jurors would base their decisions. Replica-
tions of Kassin and Garfi eld’s study are necessary to insure that these results are general-
izable. In addition, comparisons between graphic verbal and graphic visual evidence may 
provide a more revealing illustration of the relationship between graphic evidence and jury 
decisions. Perhaps the visually gruesome nature of crime scene photographs and video-
tapes is not what is most infl uential. Descriptions of the crime in terms of highly graphic 
imagery may be suffi cient to produce the desired effect, rather than the necessity of view-
ing disturbing photographs. Graphic visual evidence may add nothing to what the verbal 
accounts of prosecutors could provide. 
Likewise, variations in the gory details of photographic and videotaped evidence may 
prove to be a possible mediating infl uence on the effects of graphic evidence on juries. 
Assuredly, differences in the quality of the visual evidence, as well as how completely 
the photograph captures the victim’s injuries, occur naturally in the forensic setting. Per-
haps the infl uence of graphic evidence on jury decision making varies as a linear function 
of how gruesome the evidence is. Also, variations in the amount of graphic evidence pre-
sented in a given trial may result in desensitizing juries to the effects that the evidence may 
have otherwise. Relatedly, color versus black-and-white photography may prove to be im-
portant. An intuitive assumption would hold that color photography is likely to be more 
detailed and thus more graphic than black-and-white photography (Whalen & Blanchard, 
1982), thereby affecting juries to a greater extent. These are empirical questions that de-
serve further study. 
Concerning crime scene reenactments, there are many variables left to be examined. 
The perspective from which the reenactment is fi lmed could affect its impact. Certain an-
gles may make the crime scenario appear more violent, for example. Similarly, the distance 
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from which the action is fi lmed may affect its apparent violent content. Close-ups could 
focus on the injuries of the victim, the painful expressions of the victim, or the violent be-
havior of the defendant. In addition, portrayals of the victim or defendant and the graph-
ic nature of the crime may be skewed by the party that is presenting the evidence (Hennes, 
1994). None of the above variables have been systematically varied, however. The contro-
versy that surrounds the admittance of crime scene reenactments (Hennes, 1994) would 
benefi t greatly from research that examines these variables. 
In cases of domestic violence, questions remain unresolved as to how evidence of prior 
acts of violence may affect a jury’s likelihood to convict. Since this kind of evidence is ad-
missible if it provides an additional indication of the defendant’s intent, motive, pattern of 
behavior, or identity (Linsky, 1995), research is needed to assess what kind of an impact it 
may have on jury decision making. Specifi cally, the extent and severity, as well as the fre-
quency of occurrence of the past abuse may be important mediating factors to study. Addi-
tionally, how this evidence is presented (e.g., graphic pictures, oral testimony, police reports, 
or expert testimony) may also affect how prior acts of violence are perceived. 
Likewise, there are many questions still left unanswered regarding the effects of hei-
nousness on jury decisions. Of the empirical articles reviewed above, none have partialled 
out the various factors that may impinge on how heinous a crime is perceived to be and its 
resultant effects. Hester and Smith (1973) defi ned heinousness in terms of the characteris-
tics of the victim as well as the nature of the act. Undoubtedly, the characteristics of the de-
fendant would also be worth including. Hester and Smith confounded the gender and age 
of the victim between conditions. Additionally, Finkel et al. (1994) used case descriptions 
that varied widely on the characteristics of the victims and defendant and the nature of the 
crime. For the effects of heinousness to be more clearly understood, each of these factors 
should be given separate consideration. 
Aspects of the defendant alone could affect the perceived heinousness of a crime. For ex-
ample, gender could interact with the heinousness of the case. Heightened sentences for more 
heinous crimes may be given differentially to men and women. Similarly, the race of the 
defendant may prove to be another mediating factor. Those characteristics of the defendant 
which may affect the perceived heinousness of a crime may also hold for the victim as well. 
Gender, age, social status, and whether the victim offered any provocation may be important 
variables to consider. Individual differences among the jurors may also provide an addition-
al approach to how violence affects jury decisions. Death-qualifi ed jurors may view violence 
differently from death-scrupled jurors, for instance (Luginbuhl& Middendorf, 1988). More-
over, characteristics of the defendant, victim, and jurors should be combined factorially, in 
order to determine potentially revealing interactions. 
Rosen (1986) indicated that many courts have been revising their heinousness statutes 
to include evidence of physical abuse and torture. A worthwhile line of research would 
be to examine how manipulating such characteristics of the crime would affect its per-
ceived heinousness. This is an important question in its own right and with current legal 
trends would offer support for contemporary concerns. Relatedly, manipulation of multiple 
crimes (e.g., murder plus robbery), as was done by Finkel et al. (1994) and White (1987), 
merits further examination. In both of those experiments, heinousness was not determined 
a priori and the multiple crime component was confounded with other factors (e.g., charac-
teristics of the victim), so the effects of multiple crimes are not certain. 
Finally, research shows that juror comprehension of instructions in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial is poor (Diamond, 1993; Haney & Lynch, 1994). A plausible hypothesis 
is that juror comprehension of aggravating and mitigating circumstances may affect how 
they render sentences. Additionally, how heinousness is defi ned for jurors (e.g., “vile” vs. 
“cruel”) may affect their sentencing decisions. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To date, only scant empirical attention has been paid to the questions of whether and 
how evidence of violence affects jury decisions. What research has been done offers some 
intriguing fi ndings. For example, graphic evidence of the crime scene infl uences mock ju-
rors’ conviction threshold, but it does not affect their verdict (Kassin & Garfi eld, 1991). 
This fi nding suggests that more research is clearly needed that explores the effect of dif-
ferent types and amounts of graphic evidence. It is also unclear what effect graphic crime 
scene reenactments would have on jurors. Evidence of a prior history of violence, on the 
other hand, does tend to infl uence mock jurors’ verdicts, especially in the case of trials of 
battered women (Follingstad et al., 1989; Kasian et al., 1993). 
With respect to heinousness, several experiments suggest that although jurors’ understand-
ing of aggravating circumstances is limited (Diamond, 1993; Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988), 
their sentencing decisions in capital cases are nonetheless infl uenced by a crime’s heinousness 
(Hendrick & Shaffer, 1975; Hester & Smith, 1973; Finkel & Duff, 1991; Finkel et al., 1994; 
White, 1987). These fi ndings indicate that jurors are responding properly to this aggravating 
circumstance in determining sentence; however, it is not yet clear what elements of a crime 
constitute heinousness. Previous research has failed to partial out factors having to do with the 
defendant from characteristics of the victim, as well as from properties of the criminal act itself 
(e.g., the manner in which a murder was conducted). 
Violent crime is more common now than it was ten years ago (FBI, 1996; Petersilia, 
1994). A better understanding of how jurors react to evidence of violence would contribute 
to a fairer and more equitable disposition of these cases at trial; yet there is much more that 
we do not know about this issue than we do know. By pointing out the major gaps in our 
current knowledge of jurors’ perceptions of violence, we hope that future research will ad-
dress some of these important questions. 
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